We explore some topics in the model theory of sheaves of modules. First we describe the formal language that we use. Then we present some examples of sheaves obtained from quivers. These, and other examples, will serve as illustrations and as counterexamples. Then we investigate the notion of strong minimality from model theory to see what it means in this context. We also look briefly at the relation between global, local and pointwise versions of properties related to acyclicity.

. Computational chemistry grew in a new era of “desktop modeling,” which coincided with a growing demand for modeling software, especially from the pharmaceutical industry. Parameterization of models in computational chemistry is an arduous enterprise, and we argue that this activity leads, in this specific context, to tensions among scientists regarding the epistemic opacity transparency of parameterized methods and the software implementing them. We relate one flame war from the Computational Chemistry mailing List in order to assess in detail the (...) relationships between modeling methods, parameterization, software and the various forms of their enclosure or disclosure. Our claim is that parameterization issues are an important and often neglected source of epistemic opacity and that this opacity is entangled in methods and software alike. Models and software must be addressed together to understand the epistemological tensions at stake. (shrink)

In a previous article on cosmological arguments, I have put forward a few examples of complete infinite and circular explanations, and argued that complete non-wellfounded explanations such as these might explain the present state of the world better than their well-founded theistic counterparts (Billon, 2021). Although my aim was broader, the examples I gave there implied merely causal explanations. In this article, I would like to do three things: • Specify some general informative conditions for complete and incomplete non-wellfounded causal (...) explanations that can be used to assess candidate explanations and to generate new examples of complete non-wellfounded explanations. • Show that these conditions, which concern chains of causal explanations, easily generalize to chains of metaphysical, grounding explanations and even to chains involving other “determination relations” such as supervenience. • Apply these general conditions to the recent debates against the existence of nonwellfounded chains of grounds and show, with a couple of precise examples, that the latter can be complete, and that just like in the case of causal explanations, non-wellfoundedness can in fact be an aset rather than a liability. (shrink)

Computational reproducibility possesses its own dynamics and narratives of crisis. Alongside the difficulties of computing as an ubiquitous yet complex scientific activity, computational reproducibility suffers from a naive expectancy of total reproducibility and a moral imperative to embrace the principles of free software as a non-negotiable epistemic virtue. We argue that the epistemic issues at stake in actual practices of computational reproducibility are best unveiled by focusing on software as a pivotal concept, one that is surprisingly often overlooked in accounts (...) of reproducibility issues. Software is not only about designing and coding but also about maintaining, supporting, distributing, licensing, and governance; it is not only about developers but also about users. We focus on openness debates among computational chemists involved in molecular modeling software packages as empirical grounding for our argument. We then identify and analyse four epistemic characteristics as key to the role of software in computational reproducibility. (shrink)

Patients suffering from depersonalization complain of feeling detached from their body, their mental states, and actions or even from themselves. In this chapter, I argue that depersonalization consists in the lack of a phenomenal feature that marks my experiences as mine, which is usually called “mineness,” and that the study of depersonalization constitutes a neglected yet incomparable probe to assess empirically the scope, role, and even the nature of mineness. Here is how I will proceed. After describing depersonalization (§2) and (...) arguing that it involves a lack of mineness (§3) I will confront a series of objections (§4). I will then spell out what depersonalization can teach us about the scope of mineness (§5), about its role and psychological function (§6) and even about its nature (§7). (shrink)

ABSTRACT This study focuses on the notions of ‘ruins’, ‘savage knowledge’, and ‘American race’ in the works of the German naturalist Carl Friedrich Philipp von Martius (1794–1868). A somewhat neglected figure in the history of anthropology and of natural history, Martius was regarded by scholars from Europe and the Americas as a leading figure in botany and ethnology in the nineteenth century. In this article, I discuss how Martius articulated: (1) the notion of American race, that is, a broad characterization (...) of the native peoples of the Americas rooted in a complex natural history which brought together seemingly disparate fields of knowledge, such as medicine, botany, theology, philology, and mythology; (2) having ruins as a guiding concept, which helped him to make sense of American natives; and (3) savage knowledge – a concept semantically aligned to that of ruins, and among whose principal modes of expression was shamanic practice. (shrink)

According to what we will call subjectivity theories of consciousness, there is a constitutive connection between phenomenal consciousness and subjectivity: there is something it is like for a subject to have mental state M only if M is characterized by a certain mine-ness or for-me-ness. Such theories appear to face certain psychopathological counterexamples: patients appear to report conscious experiences that lack this subjective element. A subsidiary goal of this chapter is to articulate with greater precision both subjectivity theories and the (...) psychopathological challenge they face. The chapter’s central goal is to present two new approaches to defending subjectivity theories in the face of this challenge. What distinguishes these two approaches is that they go to great lengths to interpret patients’ reports at face value – greater length, at any rate, than more widespread approaches in the extant literature. (shrink)

Depersonalization is a pathological condition consisting in a deep modification of the way things appear to a subject, leading him to feel estranged from his body, his actions, his thoughts, his mind and even from himself. In this article, I argue that the study of depersonalization raises three challenges for recent theories of the sense of bodily ownership. These challenges—which I call the centrality challenge, the dissociation challenge and the grounding challenge— thwart most of these theories and suggest that the (...) sense of bodily ownership hinges on a phenomenal mark of mineness that can not be accounted for in terms of our sensory, interoceptive, agentive, cognitive or affective dispositions and that is psychologically primitive. In short: that mineness is first. (shrink)

O campo interdisciplinar dos novos estudos sociais das infâncias parte de uma ruptura epistemológica com as abordagens clássicas das ciências que adotam visões biologizantes, essencialistas e universais da criança e encontra na etnografia uma possibilidade de conceituação de criança enquanto sujeito ativo e de infância enquanto categoria social geracional. O reconhecimento desses conceitos de criança e de infância pela etnografia na pesquisa com crianças implica voltar-se para a criança como o outro, o diferente, o estrangeiro. A proposta de ruptura teórico-conceitual (...) na investigação das infâncias exige a implementação de metodologias que focalizem as experiências, os pontos de vista e as vozes das crianças, compreendendo-as enquanto processo, em outras palavras, constante construção. Portanto, para essa perspectiva, a criança não é o objeto do estudo, mas é sujeito que interage com o pesquisador na construção dos sentidos e significados da pesquisa. O texto está organizado em três partes que abordam os aspectos epistemológicos, teórico-conceituais e metodológicos do debate proposto. Ao final, procura-se uma articulação entre os diferentes aspectos da discussão, propondo uma reflexão sobre a ética e a alteridade, reconhecendo que a diferença atravessa as relações humanas e, portanto, é o diferente, o incomum, o incompreensível, o oposto, o desigual, o inalcançável que marca e define a pesquisa com criança. (shrink)

This paper explores the intricate relationship between the concept of “savage knowledge,” its significance during the ninteenth and twentieth centuries, and the emerging field of ethnoscience. It specifically focuses on the Amazon region as a pivotal area in the development of ethnoscience, examining the contributions of renowned naturalists Carl von Martius, Richard Spruce, and Richard Schultes, who each conducted scientific expeditions to the Amazon during this era. Their works are crucial in reevaluating the dynamic interplay between the Western perception of (...) the “savage,” the scientific principles that underpin it, and the geopolitics of knowledge exchange between countries in the global north and south. I argue that the contextual conditions which made possible the emergence of ethnoscience, including imperial assimilation, extraction, and coloniality, continue to exert influence on twentieth century political discourses concerning the integration of indigenous cultures into global politics. This influence is evident through the analysis of a UNESCO document in the second part of the paper. The study concludes that the incorporation of indigenous knowledge, systematised by ethnoscience, has often served as a pretext for controlling geographical areas historically regarded as “natural resources,” ultimately transforming them into reservoirs of indigenous epistemologies. (shrink)

Using emotional film clips is one of the most popular and effective methods of emotion elicitation. The main goal of the present study was to develop and test the effectiveness of a new and comprehensive set of emotional film excerpts. Fifty film experts were asked to remember specific film scenes that elicited fear, anger, sadness, disgust, amusement, tenderness, as well as emotionally neutral scenes. For each emotion, the 10 most frequently mentioned scenes were selected and cut into film clips. Next, (...) 364 participants viewed the film clips in individual laboratory sessions and rated each film on multiple dimensions. Results showed that the film clips were effective with regard to several criteria such as emotional discreteness, arousal, positive and negative affect. Finally, ranking scores were computed for 24 classification criteria: Subjective arousal, positive and negative affect (derived from the PANAS; Watson & Tellegen, 1988), a positive and a negative affect scores derived from the Differential Emotions Scale (DES; Izard et al., 1974), six emotional discreteness scores (for anger, disgust, sadness, fear, amusement and tenderness), and 15 “mixed feelings” scores assessing the effectiveness of each film excerpt to produce blends of specific emotions. In addition, a number of emotionally neutral film clips were also validated. The database and editing instructions to construct the film clips have been made freely available in a website. (shrink)

Natural modalities are often analysed from an abstract point of view where they are associated with putative laws of nature. However, the way possibilities are represented in physics is more complex. Lagrangian mechanics, for instance, involves two different layers of modalities: kinematical and dynamical possibilities. This paper examines the status of these two layers, both in the classical and quantum case. The quantum case is particularly problematic: we identify four possible interpretive options. The upshot is that a close inspection of (...) the way possibilities are represented in physics could lead to new ways of thinking about natural modalities. (shrink)

Depersonalization consists in a deep modification of the way things appear to a subject, leading him to feel estranged from his body, his actions, his thoughts, and his mind, and even from himself. Even though, when it was discovered at the end of the 19th century, this psychiatric condition was widely used to probe certain aspects of bodily awareness, and more specifically the sense of bodily ownership (SBO), it has been strangely neglected in contemporary debates. In this chapter, I argue (...) that because of three specific features, depersonalization raises some important challenges for current theories of the SBO. The first feature — call it “generality” — is that depersonalization does not only affect the sense of bodily ownership but also, typically, the sense of ``mental ownership’’ (SMO), the sense of agency or ``action ownership’’ (SOA), and the subject’s core sense of herself (CSS), that is, her awareness of herself as an I. The second feature is that except for the symptoms of depersonalization, depersonalized patients are hard to distinguish, psychologically, from normal subjects. This makes it hard to find psychological features that might explain their condition. The last feature, call it “fundamentality” is that the psychological features that do seem abnormal among depersonalized patients seem more likely to be explained by depersonalization than to explain it. These three features raise three challenges — the centrality challenge, the dissociation challenge, and the grounding challenge. Taken together, I will argue, these challenges suggest that the SBO depends on a form of phenomenal “mineness” that would mark my mental states as mine and that cannot be accounted for in sensorimotor, cognitive, or even affective terms. A phenomenal mineness that indeed seems to be psychologically primitive, and only accountable in neurophysiological terms. (shrink)

Several advocates of the lively field of “metaphysics of science” have recently argued that a naturalistic metaphysics should be based solely on current science, and that it should replace more traditional, intuition-based, forms of metaphysics. The aim of the present paper is to assess that claim by examining the relations between metaphysics of science and general metaphysics. We show that the current metaphysical battlefield is richer and more complex than a simple dichotomy between “metaphysics of science” and “traditional metaphysics”, and (...) that it should instead be understood as a three dimensional “box”, with one axis distinguishing “descriptive metaphysics” from “revisionary metaphysics”, a second axis distinguishing a priori from a posteriori metaphysics, and a third axis distinguishing “commonsense metaphysics”, “traditional metaphysics” and “metaphysics of science”. We use this three-dimensional figure to shed light on the project of current metaphysics of science, and to demonstrate that, in many instances, the target of that project is not defined with enough precision and clarity. (shrink)

In this paper, we put forward a new account of emergence called “transformational emergence”. Such an account captures a variety of emergence that can be considered as being diachronic and weakly ontological. The fact that transformational emergence actually constitutes a genuine form of emergence is motivated. Besides, the account is free of traditional problems surrounding more usual, synchronic versions of emergence, and it can find a strong empirical support in a specific physical phenomenon, the fractional quantum Hall effect, which has (...) long been touted as a paradigmatic case of emergence. (shrink)

This article discusses the acquisition of a physical impairment/disability through voluntary body modification, or transability. From the perspectives of critical genealogy and feminist intersectional analysis, the article considers the ability and cis*/trans* axes in order to question the boundaries between trans and transabled experience and examines two assumptions impeding the conceptualization of their placement on the same continuum: 1) trans studies assumes an able-bodied trans identity and able-bodied trans subject of analysis; and 2) disability studies assumes a cis* disabled identity. (...) The perception of transsexuality and transability as mutually exclusive phenomena results from a nonintersectional analysis of transsexuality as an issue of sex/gender, but not of ability, and of transability as an issue of ability, but not of sex/gender. Difficulty recognizing continuities between these phenomena thus stems from an ableist interpretation of sex/gender and a cisnormative* interpretation of ability. This article aims to: 1) enrich intersectional analysis in trans and disability studies and transability scholarship; 2) complicate disability studies, in which disabilities are often presumed to be “involuntary,” and encourage the decentering of a cis* subject; 3) encourage trans studies to decenter an able-bodied subject; and 4) advocate for increased dialogue and the creation of alliances between trans and disability studies and movements. (shrink)

This paper focuses on one particular case that connects climate justice and climate economics. Its contribution is twofold. First, it aims at providing a sound normative foundation for carbon pricing mechanisms around the notions of a ‘right to energy’, the ‘duty not-to-harm’ and an argument for ‘restricted compensation’. Second, it identifies the normative elements from theories of climate justice that should guide the design of market-based instruments for climate change mitigation. This will cast light on the particular moral relevance of (...) the act of internalizing a negative externality and of the funds generated by putting a price on carbon. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the claim that, as new types of neurointervention get developed allowing us to enhance various aspects of our mental functioning, we should work to prevent the use of such interventions from ever becoming the “new normal,” that is, a practice expected—even if not directly required—by employers. The author’s response to that claim is that, unlike compulsion or most cases of direct coercion, indirect coercion to use such neurointerventions is, per se, no more problematic than the pressure people (...) all find themselves under to use modern technological devices like computers or mobile phones. Few people seem to believe that special protections should be introduced to protect contemporary Neo-Luddites from such pressures. That being said, the author acknowledges that separate factors, when present, can indeed render indirect coercion to enhance problematic. The factors in question include lack of safety, fostering adaptation to oppressive circumstances, and having negative side effects that go beyond health. Nonetheless, the chapter stresses that these factors do not seem to be necessary correlates of neuroenhancement. (shrink)

Este artigo tem por objetivo apresentar a ideia de que Schopenhauer reavalia a noção de extinção com o passar do tempo através do contato com pensamentos filosóficos e científicos contemporâneos a sua vida ligados a concepções evolucionistas. Em O mundo como vontade e representação não há espaço para a consideração da extinção das espécies animais, imutáveis e eternas; ao passo que em Parerga e Paralipomena e em Sobre a vontade na natureza é comum que o autor faça alusão a conceitos (...) como generatio aequivoca, ao surgimento de espécies animais por meio de generatio in utero heterogeneo e ao seu desaparecimento. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem por objetivo principal investigar e circunscrever a relação problemática entre intelecto e cérebro na obra de Arthur Schopenhauer, de acordo com a já conhecida formulação de Eduard Zeller. Desse modo, pode-se contemplar o lugar dos conceitos de intelecto e cérebro no âmbito da explicação metafísica da natureza, tendo-se sempre como noção diretora central a distinção entre os modos de consideração do mundo, apresentadas simultaneamente ainda no texto de O mundo como vontade e como representação e aperfeiçoada (...) e mencionada com mais cuidado nas obras posteriores. Se, por um lado, o mundo é objeto de investigação através da subjetividade e de suas formas de existência, por outro ele é investigado através de um modo de consideração objetivo, que, inicialmente, toma os objetos como existentes por si mesmos, independentemente de qualquer sujeito. Sem poder existir totalmente em separado, na medida em que cada objeto existe apenas para o sujeito, ambos os modos devem confluir para a explicação completa do mundo, como complementação um do outro: o intelecto deve ser também considerado do ponto de vista objetivo e o cérebro segundo a análise do modo de consideração subjetivo, integrando-o na explicação geral do mundo e da natureza. (shrink)

Em seu texto Por quê olhar os animais?, John Berger comenta como a metáfora animal foi um recurso indispensável para revelar uma proximidade entre as espécies, e que sem o exemplo de animais seria improvável, por exemplo, descrever eventos como aqueles narrados por Homero n’A Iíada. A correlação entre vidas semelhantes e heterogêneas permitiram aos seres humanos, inspirados pelos animais, darem respostas às primeiras perguntas. É razoável afirmar que a primeira metáfora tenha sido a do animal, como um modo de (...) partilhar o mundo que lhes era comum e diferente. Mas nossa relação com os animais não-humanos também contém contradições; a criação do zoológico representou a elevação de um monumento à impossibilidade de qualquer reencontro com a animalidade. Em vez de liberados, os animais foram capturados por outras categorias políticas. Para John Berger as ambiguidades permanecem “Eles são os objetos de nosso conhecimento sempre crescente. O que sabemos sobre eles é um índice de nosso poder, e assim é um índice do que nos separa deles. Quanto mais sabemos, mais distante eles ficam.”. (shrink)

O presente artigo discute as relações entre animais não-humanos e o sensível. Para tanto, ensaia-se uma compreensão das formas animais e suas aparências expressivas, apoiando-se em ideias e teses dos filósofos franceses Merleau-Ponty e Dominique Lestel formuladas a partir do estudo do zoólogo Adolf Portmann sobre a aparência dos animais, denominado A forma animal. A investigação de Portmann, interessada em apreender fora do registro funcional do biológico o mistério que envolve as formas vivas, assimila uma nova concepção de corpo animal (...) e descobre nele uma qualidade estética de livre expressão resultante do dispêndio das aparências dos viventes não-humanos.Palavras-chave: Vida Sensível; Animalidade; Aparência; Natureza. (shrink)

Patients suffering from the Cotard syndrome can deny being alive, having guts, thinking or even existing. They can also complain that the world or time have ceased to exist. In this article, I argue that even though the leading neurocognitive accounts have difficulties meeting that task, we should, and we can, make sense of these bizarre delusions. To that effect, I draw on the close connection between the Cotard syndrome and a more common condition known as depersonalisation. Even though they (...) are not delusional, depersonalised patients seem to have experiences that are quite similar to those of Cotard patients. I argue that these experiences are essentially characterised by a lack of subjective character and of two other structural features of experience, which I call ‘the present character’ and ‘the actual character’. Cotard's nihilistic delusions simply consist in taking these anomalous experiences at face value. (shrink)

This paper offers an overview of the prospects and ethics of using AI to achieve human enhancement, and more broadly what we call intellectual augmentation (IA). After explaining the central notions of human enhancement, IA, and AI, we discuss the state of the art in terms of the main technologies for IA, with or without brain-computer interfaces. Given this picture, we discuss potential ethical problems, namely inadequate performance, safety, coercion and manipulation, privacy, cognitive liberty, authenticity, and fairness in more detail. (...) We conclude that while there are very significant technical hurdles to real human enhancement through AI, and significant ethical problems, there are also significant benefits that may realistically be achieved in ways that are consonant with a rights-based ethics as well. We also highlight the specific concerns that apply particularly to applications of AI for "sheer" IA (more realistic in the near term), and to enhancement applications, respectively. (shrink)

The concept of genidentity has been proposed as a way to better understand identity through time, especially in physics and biology. The genidentity view is utterly anti-substantialist in so far as it suggests that the identity of X through time does not presuppose whatsoever the existence of a permanent “core” or “substrate” of X. Yet applications of this concept to real science have been scarce and unsatisfying. In this paper, our aim is to show that a well-defined concept of functional (...) genidentity can be crucial to shed light on identity through time in classical physics and especially in biology. Finally, we show that understanding identity on the basis of continuity suggests a move towards an ontology of processes. (shrink)

Elementary duality between left and right modules over a ring, especially its interpretation in terms of the relevant functor categories, is discussed, as is the relationship between these categories of functors and sorts in theories of modules. A topology on the set of indecomposable pure-injective modules over a ring is introduced. This topology is dual to the Ziegler topology and may be seen as a generalisation of the Zariski topology.

In this article I interpret John Rawls’s concept of the original position as a spiritual exercise. In addition to the standard interpretation of the original position as an expository device to select principles of justice for the fundamental institutions of society, I argue that Rawls also envisages it as a “spiritual exercise”: a voluntary personal practice intended to bring about a transformation of the self. To make this argument, I draw on the work of Pierre Hadot, a philosopher and classicist, (...) who introduced the idea of spiritual exercises as central to ancient and modern conceptions of philosophy. By reading Rawls alongside Hadot, this article portrays Rawls as a thinker deeply concerned with the question of how subjects can lead more just and fulfilling lives. It also proposes that the original position as a spiritual exercise can help defend liberalism as a social and political doctrine. (shrink)

The advent of the Web is one of the defining technological events of the twentieth century, yet its impact on the fundamental questions of philosophy has not yet been explored, much less systematized. The Web, as today implemented on the foundations of the Internet, is broadly construed as the space of all items of interest identified by URIs. Originally a space of linked hypertext documents, today the Web is rapidly evolving as a universal platform for data and computation. Even swifter (...) is the Web-driven transformation of many previously unquestioned philosophical concepts of privacy, belief, intelligence, cognition, and even embodiment in surprising ways. The ensuing essays in this collection hope to explore the philosophical foundation of the World Wide Web and open the debate on whether or not the changes caused by the Web to technology and society warrant the creation of a philosophy of the Web. (shrink)

This is a commentary on Andrea Lavazza and Murilo Vilaça's article "Human Extinction and AI: What We Can Learn from the Ultimate Threat" (Lavazza & Vilaça, 2024). I discuss the potential concern that their proposal to create artificial successors to "insure" against the tragedy of human extinction might mean being too quick to accept that catastrophic prospect as inevitable, rather than single-mindedly focusing on avoiding it. I also consider the question of the value that we might reasonably assign to such (...) a future of artificial successors under the assumption that they do not enjoy phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

Entry on "Neuroenhancement" in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.

This chapter introduces the main issues and themes of the volume. Approaches to individuality from metaphysics and philosophy of science are contrasted. Recent philosophical developments regarding concepts of biological and physical individuality are exposed. These research trends show how philosophy of physics and philosophy of biology address differently the question of what an individual is. Five main divergences are identified: the centrality of part-whole questions, the issue of identical individuals, the importance of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and, (...) finally, the importance of structuralist concerns. At the end of the chapter, the structure of the book is explained in detail. (shrink)

This book introduces readers to the art of doing mathematical proofs. Proofs are the glue that holds mathematics together. They make connections between math concepts and show why things work the way they do. This book teaches the art of proofs using familiar high school concepts, such as numbers, polynomials, functions, and trigonometry. It retells math as a story, where the next chapter follows from the previous one. Readers will see how various mathematical concepts are tied, will see mathematics is (...) not a pile of formulas and facts, but has an orderly and beautiful edifice. The author begins with basic rules of logic, and then progresses through the topics already familiar to the students: numbers, inequalities, functions, polynomials, exponents, and trigonometric functions. There are also beautiful proofs for conic sections, sequences, and Fibonacci numbers. Each chapter has exercises for the reader. (shrink)

This text draws on the concepts of narrative identity and selfhood to analyze stories about accidents that resulted in severe facial burns. These adjustable accounts, regularly set out by the people concerned, are considered across two axes: for oneself and for others. The “story for oneself” mainly ensures the preservation of an identity fractured by severe trauma. For the severely burned person, it establishes continuity between an identity prior to the burn and an identity post-burn, which drastic changes to their (...) appearance have shattered. As to the “story for others,” it serves other purposes. It is aimed, in particular, at helping to identify after-effects and in this way reducing discomfort around interaction. Whatever the varied forms that they can take, these two types of stories become the expression of a struggle for recognition, led by the burn victim, to restore a relationship as much with himself as with others. (shrink)

Dans Droit et démocratie (1997), Jürgen Habermas procède à une reconstruction du système des droits et de la citoyenneté modernes. Il tente de démontrer la co-originarité de l'autonomie privée et de l'autonomie publique et de résorber la tension entre droits de l'homme et souveraineté populaire, libéralisme et républicanisme. Le présent ouvrage, issu d'un travail de doctorat, se propose de restituer les différents moments de ce paradigme procédural tout en montrant qu'il ne peut fonctionner sans le secours d'une éthique de la (...) responsabilité. Cet ouvrage se présente comme une synthèse critique de la théorie habermassienne de la citoyenneté et tente de mettre en perspective cette théorie dans l'économie générale de l'œuvre de Habermas. Les positions les plus récentes du philosophe (par exemple en matière de clonage ou de religion) sont également discutées. (shrink)

Cet article examine la place qu’occupent les réflexions sur la Planétarité en les situant par rapport à deux autres attracteurs, le Terrestre et le Global. Un certain nombre de positions idéologiques contemporaines sont ainsi comparées en fonction de leur situation vis-à-vis de ces trois opérateurs. L’élément central permettant de les distinguer n’est autre que leur rapport aux techniques. Nous proposons de dépasser la difficulté à politiser les enjeux techniques et planétaires en ayant recours au concept de communs négatifs.